

November 2022

The Social Costs of Policing

Aaron Stagoff-Belfort, Daniel Bodah, and Daniela Gilbert

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Health	2
People who face police violence or brutality experience the most severe mental health trauma, but whole communities suffer as well	3
Police violence, as well as street stops, can heighten anxiety, stress, and even sleep disturbance in children and adolescents	4
Policing can cause increased physical and psychological harm to both communities and individuals as it increases in intrusiveness and becomes a persistent feature of everyday life	5
Health effects of police stops are racially disparate: Black and brown people are more likely to suffer from anxiety or depression and worry about police brutality	6
Education	7
A range of encounters with police can impede the educational development of youth, leading to lower graduation rates	7
Policing can distort school performance and produce racial disparities in educational achievement	8
Research suggests that educational development can suffer in neighborhoods with a heavy police presence, even for students who are not stopped by police	9
Economic Well-Being	9
People who have experienced an arrest are more likely to later be unemployed, lose their jobs, or need public assistance	10
Arrests make it harder to build wealth and access credit markets	10
An arrest can cause stigma that creates barriers to employment	11
Arrests can also have profound effects on housing security	12
Civic and Social Engagement	12
Arrests can reduce voting, while police stops may catalyze demands for political change even as they reduce trust in government	13

Police killings of civilians can mobilize voting among Black and Latinx people	13
Arrests and street stops can undermine engagement with local government and disrupt informal community problem-solving	14
An arrest can suppress people’s engagement with community and social institutions like banks, hospitals, and schools	15
Conclusion	15
(Appendix A) About the Social Costs of Policing Literature: Methods and Data	16
(Appendix B) The Social Costs of Policing Study Matrix	17

Introduction

As policymakers and the public consider how best to address crime nationwide, deeper insights on policing should guide decisions about its funding and role in the provision of public safety.¹ An assumption that policing is cost-effective may guide decisions to provide law enforcement with additional resources, yet a range of policing activities can result in “social costs of policing”: people suffering physical and behavioral health problems; losing educational opportunities, jobs, housing, and transportation; and withdrawing from civic engagement.² These effects stem not only from violent interactions with police, but also from indirect exposure to routine policing activities; for instance, living in a neighborhood where police stop many people on the street. Even being arrested but not convicted and not having any continuing criminal legal system involvement can cause significant harm.

This evidence brief seeks to fill a critical gap in understanding the benefits and costs of relying on policing as a primary approach to safety. When we measure what effect policing has on public safety, we must include the social costs of policing that make communities less healthy and prosperous, and consider whether the crime reduction benefits that policing can provide may be achieved through less costly means. The American Public Health Association has declared police violence—which often stems from encounters over minor infractions—a public health issue.³ Beyond acts of police brutality, routine law enforcement actions such as arrests and street stops can also destabilize communities. Such activities are common: in the United States, more than nine million arrests are made annually—one every three seconds—though 80 percent of those are for low-level offenses, and only five percent are for serious violent crimes.⁴ Responding to social problems through policing is a policy choice, and arrests and other routine law enforcement activities can have negative consequences for public safety.

Traditional cost-benefit analyses, which do not typically consider the social costs of policing, usually find policing to be “cost-effective,” meaning it creates benefits that exceed its costs. These studies calculate government spending on policing (the cost side of the equation) and subtract it from the savings attributed to policing-driven crime reductions (the benefit side of the equation) to determine the net value to attribute to public safety benefits that policing returns. Studies that adopt this framework typically show that, due to crime prevention, policing saves more than it costs.⁵ However, omitting the collateral consequences of policing from cost-benefit analyses can result in overestimation of the benefits of policing and mislead policymakers about the effectiveness of policing in improving community safety and well-being.⁶ The harm of this omission is compounded because the social costs of American policing are primarily and unjustly borne by Black communities and other communities of color.

The social costs of policing reviewed here include

- **Damage to the health of individuals and communities**, including increased rates of physical and psychological stress, adult depression, reduced teenage mental wellness, as well as direct and vicarious trauma from negative police encounters and violence

- **Suppression of educational achievement** among teens, including poorer academic performance, decreased high school graduation rates, and fewer affected people enrolling in college
- **Harm to economic security**, such as higher rates of job loss, stigma in hiring, and financial and housing instability
- **Reductions in civic participation and community engagement**, such as people avoiding public institutions like banks and hospitals, decreasing their voting and political participation, and organizing less with their neighbors to informally solve neighborhood problems

Research reveals that the social costs and collateral consequences of policing are akin to the social costs of crime to society and should therefore be considered in parallel. For example, childhood learning can be negatively impacted by exposure to both neighborhood gun violence and a high rate of police stops.⁷ It should not be ignored that adopting anticrime strategies like this one can produce harms similar to crime. Thus, a holistic assessment of the social benefits and costs of policing relative to other non-punitive approaches should inform decisions about how to invest in community safety. Nonpunitive approaches—such as employment programs, affordable housing, access to health care including mental health services, as well as improvements to infrastructure like adding street lighting, green space, and other public services—can improve public safety without harmful collateral consequences for communities.⁸

Health

Encounters with police can be stressful and traumatic events triggering adverse mental health effects. When policing is part of the everyday ecosystem of a neighborhood, community health can suffer. This is often most evident in heavily policed communities of color, where encounters with police can repeat and reinforce centuries of racial discrimination and the historical failures of the state to keep people in these neighborhoods safe. Contact with law enforcement in these neighborhoods also has a cumulative effect, exacerbating the trauma of previous bad experiences and magnifying feelings of sadness, fear, and anger at the thought of future negative encounters. When policing is unfair, people’s accounts of such experiences spread through social networks and harm the health of even residents who are not personally subject to police contact. Processing traumatic stress can also be more difficult for youth, especially for those with strained family networks or those yet to learn protective and healthy coping mechanisms. All of this can distort cognitive growth and development.

Twenty-five studies reviewed by the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) provide evidence of the effects of policing on a host of health outcomes including anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), suicidal ideation, depression, and psychotic episodes. (See Appendix B: The Social Costs of Policing Study Matrix, available online.) These studies document the negative effect

policing has on individual and population health, as well as the disparate impact of policing on Black and Latinx communities.

People who face police violence or brutality experience the most severe mental health trauma, but whole communities suffer as well

Studies show that police killings can be detrimental to the mental health of entire communities. For example, Jacob Bor, Atheendar S. Venkataramani, David R. Williams, and Alexander C. Tsai found a 3.3 percent increase in reported poor mental health days among Black people associated with each police killing of an unarmed Black person that occurred in their state of residence in the previous three months.⁹ This contributed to 55 million additional poor mental health days per year among Black American adults, similar to the mental health burden of diabetes.¹⁰ The study found no corresponding impact on white people, and killings of armed civilians did not affect mental health at all, regardless of race.¹¹ Desmond Ang found in a 2021 paper that Los Angeles high school students who lived near the site of a recent police killing were twice as likely to report feeling unsafe outside of school in the year following the event, which led to a significant increase in the number of students classified as suffering from emotional disturbance (ED) each year.¹²

Although police killings have prompted widespread public condemnation and protest, nonfatal police violence also negatively impacts psychological health.¹³ Jordan E. DeVlyder and colleagues, in a 2017 paper, used national survey data and found that people who had a physically violent encounter with police were 77 percent more likely to suffer psychotic experiences, which include delusional moods, paranoia, and hallucinations.¹⁴ Those who had experienced police violence were also 4.5 times more likely to attempt suicide in the year following the incident and 10.7 times more likely when police had used a weapon.¹⁵ Each additional experience of physical or sexual violence by police increased reports of psychotic episodes. Communities of color and LGBTQ+ people were more likely to face physical and sexual violence, as well as threatening and intimidating behavior. As a result, compared to the general population, these communities had greater odds of experiencing psychological distress and suicidal ideation, and were at greater risk of dying by suicide. Nicholas A. Smith and his colleagues collected reports from adult patients in two Chicago medical clinics about their experiences with both police and community violence.¹⁶ They measured hypervigilance, a state of “abnormally heightened alertness, especially to potential threats or perceived dangers.”¹⁷ Their results indicated that exposure to police violence was associated with a 9.8 percentage point increase in hypervigilance, nearly twice the increase associated with exposure to community violence.¹⁸ Although merely experiencing a police stop was not associated with higher levels of hypervigilance, exposure to actual or threatened death or serious injury during a

stop predicted hypervigilance scores 20 percentage points higher than for people who did not report a traumatic police stop.¹⁹ Increases in hypervigilance were also associated with higher blood pressure.²⁰

Police violence, as well as street stops, can heighten anxiety, stress, and even sleep disturbance in children and adolescents

Police contact can have a pronounced effect on children's anxiety and stress. Christopher R. Browning and a group of colleagues studied levels of the stress hormone cortisol in 2021 in Columbus, Ohio—area children. The researchers found that the cortisol levels in Black boys who lived near the site of a recent incident in which police killed a resident were 46 percent higher than cortisol levels of those who did not live near such an incident.²¹ Cortisol levels were unchanged for Black girls and white youth.²²

Because adolescent brains are in a highly impressionable stage of cognitive development, police contact can harm children even more than adults. This can happen at a very young age. Amanda Geller found in a 2017 working paper that across 20 U.S. cities, the average age at which youth were first stopped was between 12 and 13.²³ Although 95 percent of teens who had been stopped reported five or fewer stops, teens in the top percentile of stops were stopped between 14 and 50 times.²⁴

Studies have consistently demonstrated that negative experiences during stops—for example, when students were handcuffed with no arrest made, when officers used harsh language or racial slurs, or when police used force or threatened to do so—have been associated with worse mental health.²⁵ For example, Dylan B. Jackson and colleagues used national survey data in 2019 to find that youth who reported hearing racial slurs during a police stop scored substantially higher on tests evaluating social stigma and posttraumatic stress compared to youth who did not encounter racial animus during a police stop.²⁶

Studies have also demonstrated that adolescents stopped by police report greater levels of anxiety, depression, stress, and PTSD-related symptoms. Jaquelyn L. Jahn and her colleagues found in a 2020 paper that Black and white girls who experienced two or more police stops in the prior six months had depression and poor mental health scores that were substantially higher than those of girls who were never stopped.²⁷ Both Black and white girls who had been stopped two or more times had lower emotional, psychological, and social well-being scores, with Black girls and girls with an incarcerated parent suffering the worst.²⁸

Policing can have a harmful effect on adolescent sleep and stress as well. For example, in a 2020 study, Dylan B. Jackson and another group of colleagues found that youth who had been stopped multiple times by police had 140 percent greater odds of suffering from sleep deprivation and 100 percent greater odds of having trouble sleeping most nights of the week.²⁹

The odds of sleep problems increased by 97 percent for youth who reported “multiple forms of vicarious exposure to police stops,” which included both witnessing and personally knowing someone stopped by police.³⁰ Even being stopped by police only a single time led to sleep deprivation and trouble sleeping.³¹

Policing can cause increased physical and psychological harm to both communities and individuals as it increases in intrusiveness and becomes a persistent feature of everyday life

Research has shown that police stops increased stress in Black college students in the Midwest and anxiety and PTSD-related symptoms in young men in New York City and Chicago.³² As the rate of police stops, searches, and use of force on civilians rises, a host of individual health measures suffer.

For example, in a 2016 paper, Abigail A. Sewell, Kevin A. Jefferson, and Hedwig Lee found that men who live in New York City neighborhoods where police engaged in higher rates of use of force and frisks were more likely to report psychological distress.³³ In neighborhoods where men faced a 7.7 percent increased risk of police using force against a pedestrian, they were 7 percent more likely to report severe feelings of nervousness.³⁴ In neighborhoods where men faced a 9 percent increased risk of being frisked, they were 11 percent more likely to report severe nervousness and 17 percent more likely to report more severe feelings of worthlessness.³⁵ In a separate 2016 study, Sewell and Jefferson also showed that more frequent use of stop, question, and frisk (SQF) came with costs for physical well-being: within a neighborhood, a 9 percent increased risk of being frisked increased the odds of a diabetes diagnosis by 11.7 percent, increased the odds of a high blood pressure diagnosis by 17.2 percent, and increased the odds of having an asthmatic episode by 14.8 percent.³⁶ Research consistently demonstrates that the negative impacts of experiences with police on health outcomes become worse the more the experiences are repeated. For example, Sirry Alang, Donna McAlpine, and Malcolm McClain used national survey data in a 2021 paper to demonstrate that people who experienced police stops that they perceived as negative and unnecessary had 37 percent greater odds of reporting a depressed mood and 43 percent greater odds of reporting anxiety compared to those with no negative police encounters.³⁷ Some studies found a cumulative deleterious health effect from more frequent contact with law enforcement. Jana Hirschtick and her colleagues found in their 2018 study that men in Chicago who had experienced at least 15 police stops were three times as likely to have PTSD symptoms.³⁸ While their focus was on arrests rather than stops, in a 2017 publication, Naomi F. Sugie and Kristin Turney found that an arrest was associated with a 12 to 14.3 percent decline in mental health, made worse with each additional arrest.³⁹

Health effects of police stops are racially disparate: Black and brown people are more likely to suffer from anxiety or depression and worry about police brutality

Recent studies have identified racially disparate consequences of policing on depression.⁴⁰ Abhery Das and colleagues studied data from five states and found in a 2021 paper that depression-related emergency department visits among Black people increased 11 percent during the three months following a police shooting of an unarmed Black civilian in their county.⁴¹ Lisa Bowleg, writing in 2020 with four colleagues, observed that for Black men in Washington, DC, negative encounters with the police, and efforts to avoid the police altogether, led to higher rates of depression.⁴² In a 2021 paper, Sophie I. Leib and her colleagues examined the impact of policing on a developmental process by which children report declining depression as they age. They found that when Black teens were subjected to more police stops, their reported depression rates did not decline as much as those of other teens.⁴³ In addition, perceived disrespect by police during the stops made this depression worse.⁴⁴

The prospect that Black people or their family members will be treated poorly by police can also contribute to depression, anxiety, and sleep-related difficulties. In their 2017 paper, Fleda Mask Jackson, Sherman A. James, Tracy Curry Owens, and Alpha F. Bryan demonstrated that Black pregnant women from the metropolitan Atlanta area who anticipated that their children would have negative experiences with the police were more likely to suffer from depression.⁴⁵ Women who agreed that Black youth face a higher risk than other children of having negative experiences with police experienced antenatal depression symptoms at a rate almost 12 times higher than those who did not.⁴⁶ Dylan B. Jackson and Kristin Turney found that the mothers of children who were stopped by police were 69 percent more likely to report depression-related sleep difficulties and 79 percent more likely to have anxiety-related sleep difficulties.⁴⁷ Even a single police stop was associated with a substantial increase in both depression- and anxiety-related sleep problems for mothers.⁴⁸ As youth experienced higher levels of stigma and trauma associated with a stop, their mothers experienced increased sleep disturbance. Using national survey data, Sirry Alang and her colleagues found that people who reported that they sometimes worry that they or someone close to them will be a victim of police brutality were 32 percent more likely to report a depressed mood and 40 percent more likely to report anxiety than those who reported that they never worry about police violence.⁴⁹ For those who reported that they always worry about police brutality, these figures increased to 113 percent greater odds of depression and 138 percent greater odds of anxiety.⁵⁰ In this study, among people who had negative experiences with police, Black and Latinx people were more likely to suffer from depression than white people.⁵¹

Education

Pervasive police presence in the neighborhood that children grow up in or in the schools they attend can undermine their academic growth. Research shows that socioeconomically disadvantaged communities, particularly communities of color, are most likely to experience intensive policing.⁵² An arrest or other negative encounter with police is a fundamentally disruptive experience, particularly for children. It can cause students to miss school or fall behind on schoolwork, face harsher treatment from family and broader support networks, and carry a criminal record that looms when they apply to college or for employment. Pervasive police contact during adolescence increases the chances that these interactions will turn punitive through an arrest or other formal sanctions, which can lead to harsher treatment at school, especially in institutions with “zero tolerance” disciplinary policies. Teens with these experiences typically have lower grade point averages (GPAs), have worse standardized test scores, and take less advanced coursework. They are more likely to not complete high school and less likely to enroll in college. Furthermore, emerging evidence suggests that the educational outcomes of young Black men suffer the most, in part because they are more likely than other young people to be stopped, arrested, or mistreated by law enforcement.

A range of encounters with police can impede the educational development of youth, leading to lower graduation rates

Nine studies Vera reviewed found evidence that police contact—ranging from street stops to arrests to nearby police killings—leads to lower high school graduation and college enrollment rates.⁵³ A 2006 study by Jön Bernburg and Marvin Krohn tracked public middle school students in Rochester, New York, through the age of 31 and found that compared to youth under the age of 16 with no arrests, youth arrested during childhood were more than 70 percent less likely to graduate high school.⁵⁴ Paul Hirschfield, in a 2009 paper, observed outcomes for middle school students in Chicago public schools and found that ninth graders who were arrested during the first year of the study were more than twice as likely to not complete high school as students from the same sample group who were arrested the following year.⁵⁵ The author concluded that an arrest was a “probable and important cause of the ‘graduation crisis.’”⁵⁶ A 2012 study by Giza Lopes, Marvin Krohn, and Alan J. Lizotte found that an arrest in adolescence more than tripled the probability of not obtaining a high school degree.⁵⁷ A 2016 study by researchers Alex Widdowson, Sonja Siennick, and Carter Hay found that an arrest resulted in a 42 percent decrease in the probability of young adults attending a four-year college in the year after high

school graduation.⁵⁸ An almost 10 percent gap in college matriculation rates remained even 10 years after high school graduation.⁵⁹

Policing can distort school performance and produce racial disparities in educational achievement

Five recent studies examining the effect of a range of police interactions on children's school performance found that policing has a harmful impact on the GPAs and standardized test scores of children, particularly Black and Latinx students.⁶⁰ For example, researchers Joscha Legewie and Jeffrey Fagan evaluated the New York City Police Department's (NYPD's) Operation Impact program, which operated from 2004 to 2012.⁶¹ The program sent officers to specific zones in precincts with instructions to maximize policing strategies such as SQF and the enforcement of public order offenses.⁶² The authors demonstrated that Operation Impact substantially decreased 13- to 15-year-old Black boys' New York State English Language Arts and Mathematics standardized test performance, in part by reducing Black boys' school attendance by an average of 1.35 extra missed school days in a 180-day school year.⁶³ Operation Impact's effect on this measure of educational performance represented about one-fifth of the test score gap between Black and white students.⁶⁴ The authors suggested that the harmful effect of policing strategies like Operation Impact may "wipe out the potential benefits" of educational programs intended to boost academic achievement.⁶⁵

Researchers David S. Kirk and Robert J. Sampson found that Chicago public school students who were arrested were 43 percent more likely not to complete high school compared to those who were not arrested, and only 16 percent of those arrested went on to enroll in a four-year college compared to 35 percent of those with no arrest history.⁶⁶ A 2020 report by Desmond Ang found that local police killings were responsible for nearly 2,000 Black and Latinx students dropping out of Los Angeles-area schools from 2002 to 2016.⁶⁷ In addition to decreasing graduation and college enrollment rates, nearby police killings lowered student GPAs.⁶⁸ Although there was no statistically significant GPA decrease for white or Asian students, Black students experienced an average decrease of 0.038 GPA points on a four-point scale, and Latinx students saw an average decrease of 0.030 points.⁶⁹ Similar to the paper on Operation Impact, this study found that GPA decreases due to a police killing of a civilian overshadowed the average benefits of several evidence-based education reform policies, including student incentives and tutoring.⁷⁰

A 2020 working paper by Andrew Bacher-Hicks and Elijah de la Campa assessed SQF policing of New York City middle school students outside of school settings and highlighted racial inequalities in the social impact of policing.⁷¹ An increase in the number of police stops appeared to generate moderately improved school safety outcomes for white and Asian students but not for Black students.⁷² The study found that high school graduation and college enrollment

rates were reduced as a result of increased use of SQF, but only for Black students, who were far more likely to experience SQF—Black youth were 6 percent more likely not to complete high school, 5 percent less likely to enroll in college, and 8 percent less likely to remain enrolled.⁷³ In contrast, the study found no negative impacts for white and Asian students living in areas where the NYPD increased SQF practices.⁷⁴ The study also found that school absences increased primarily for Black students, with the percentage of students missing more than 10 percent of school days increasing by 5 percent for Black students for every 29 additional monthly stops in a precinct.⁷⁵ Increased use of SQF was associated with modest increases in school safety (for example, a decrease of 4 percent in serious incidents in school), which primarily accrued to white and Asian students.⁷⁶ Ultimately, the paper found that, for Black students, the harmful effects of police stops outweighed the benefits to school safety.⁷⁷

Research suggests that educational development can suffer in neighborhoods with a heavy police presence, even for students who are not stopped by police

Even when young people do not have direct encounters with police themselves, the mere fact of living in a heavily policed neighborhood—where children witness or hear about their peers' encounters with law enforcement—may be enough to imperil their educational development. Using a nationally representative data set in a 2020 study, Aaron Gottlieb and Robert Wilson found that, compared to those with no police contact, the GPAs of students who had been arrested were 0.31 points lower on a four-point scale.⁷⁸ Students stopped by police had GPAs 0.13 points lower, and those with vicarious exposure, who witnessed a stop or knew someone who had been stopped, had GPAs 0.08 points lower.⁷⁹ In addition, Juan Del Toro, Alvin Thomas, Ming-Te Wang, and Diane Hughes found in their 2019 working paper that the psychological distress and sleep problems that children experience from both direct and vicarious police stops help explain why heavily policed students' academic performance suffers; moreover, the study found that these negative mental health outcomes most strongly affected students of color.⁸⁰

Economic Well-Being

In the United States, 64 percent of men who are unemployed have been arrested by age 35.⁸¹ In a society where a missed day of work or a criminal record can result in job loss, difficulty finding future employment, and housing instability, the repercussions of police encounters like an arrest can be profoundly disruptive over the course of a person's life. As a result, even a single arrest

can exacerbate economic inequality and instability. An arrest can decrease long-term economic self-sufficiency not just for people who are arrested but for their families and wider social networks as well, who rely on mutual assistance to buffer financial precarity. When someone in a household loses employment following an arrest, that person's family may not be able to pay for food, housing, or childcare. Financial concerns may worsen if the family needs to pay bail, legal fines, or fees, or continue paying bills during case proceedings. These collateral consequences can destabilize communities, increasing scarcity in the very neighborhoods that have been historically subject to disinvestment and neglect.

People who have experienced an arrest are more likely to later be unemployed, lose their jobs, or need public assistance

For a 1998 study, Shawn D. Bushway used national survey data to find that although young white men experienced employment gains whether or not they had been arrested, those who were never arrested were employed 10.78 (26 percent) more weeks in the previous year compared to people who had been arrested for the first time.⁸² Giza Lopes and colleagues Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, Nicole M. Schmidt, Bob Edward Vásquez, and Jön Gunnar Bernburg assessed in a 2012 study multiple waves of survey data measuring seventh- and eighth-grade students in Rochester, New York, public schools beginning at 14 years old and continuing through 31 years old.⁸³ The study found that an arrest during adolescence had a significant indirect effect on several socioeconomic outcomes for respondents more than a decade later.⁸⁴ People arrested between the ages of 21 and 23 were 13 percent more likely to receive public assistance and 16 percent more likely to be unemployed between the ages of 29 and 31 than those with no arrest.⁸⁵ The study also identified the cascading effects of an adolescent arrest throughout one's life—an arrest in adolescence increased the likelihood of being arrested later in young adulthood, and, in turn, young adults with an arrest history were at greater risk of unemployment and more likely to be dependent on public assistance benefits later in life.⁸⁶ For example, people arrested between 21 and 23 were more than twice as likely to be receiving public assistance at age 29.⁸⁷

Arrests make it harder to build wealth and access credit markets

Wealth accumulation, including access to lending and credit, is a significant dimension of economic and racial inequality.⁸⁸ Research shows that racial disparities in access to credit have

kept Black families and other families of color from accumulating wealth.⁸⁹ Across racial and ethnic groups, families that are low income hold less “good” debt, like mortgages or motor vehicle loans that can build long-term net worth, than families that are middle income.⁹⁰ Michelle Maroto and Bryan L. Sykes used national survey data to study the impact of an arrest on individual net worth, financial assets, and debt accumulation between the ages of 25 and 30.⁹¹ This age range is a critical period for building wealth.⁹² The study found that financial assets declined by 53 percent, and an arrest decreased a person’s financial assets even for people with little prior wealth.⁹³ Maroto and Sykes also found that people who were arrested were far less likely to get married, which has been shown to increase family wealth and income and explains part of the relationship between an arrest and decreased wealth.⁹⁴ This finding suggests that the timing of an arrest in the lifecycle has crucial implications for building material prosperity.⁹⁵ As Sarah Brayne showed in a 2014 paper, an arrest may also lead to “system avoidance” behaviors that make people less likely to access banks and other financial institutions.⁹⁶

Sonja E. Siennick and Alex O. Widdowson published a study in 2020 that used national survey data to measure whether an arrest as a juvenile disrupted later wealth accumulation during young adulthood, measuring outcomes for 10 types of assets, six types of debt, and net worth for respondents at ages 20, 25, and 30.⁹⁷ For people arrested as juveniles, the total value of their assets by age 20 was 20 percent lower than the value of the assets of those who were not arrested.⁹⁸ By age 30, wealth disparities had widened: those who had been arrested as juveniles had 47 percent fewer assets, 74 percent less debt—indicating trouble accessing credit—and a net worth \$17,183 lower than respondents who had not been arrested as juveniles.⁹⁹ Because not all debt affects household finances equally, this study built on previous research by assessing the accumulation of different types of debt. It found that people arrested as juveniles held less “good” debt, like mortgage loans, which can benefit net worth, but the same amount of “bad” debt, such as credit card or other consumer debt, as the control group.¹⁰⁰

An arrest can cause stigma that creates barriers to employment

Research has documented over many decades that the stigma associated with having a criminal conviction plays a role in limiting employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated people.¹⁰¹ Even though arrest records that do not result in conviction are readily accessible to employers during routine background checks, few studies measure their impact on hiring practices.¹⁰² However, audit studies have revealed significant bias in hiring based on both race and criminal record status. Those biases appear to extend to people with even a single arrest resulting in no conviction. Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, Ebony Ruhland, and Hilary K. Whitham used an experimental audit method to determine that a prior arrest for disorderly conduct that resulted in no conviction led to lower job callback rates across races, after factoring

in the impact of direct contact with hiring managers.¹⁰³ An arrest record decreased the odds of a callback by 41.4 percent for white people and 36.9 percent for Black people.¹⁰⁴ Testers of each race saw a 4 percentage point decrease in callbacks when reporting an arrest, which impacted Black people more because they had a lower overall callback rate.¹⁰⁵ Although the effect of an arrest record was less than that of a prison record in similar audit tests, Uggen and his colleagues still found that an arrest had a “consequential” effect on job applicants, especially considering that racial disparities in arrest rates make Black Americans far more likely to experience this stigma.¹⁰⁶

Arrests can also have profound effects on housing security

An arrest increases the likelihood of residential instability for young adults, according to a 2021 study by Cody Warner and Brianna Remster. An arrest causes people both to leave their independent housing arrangements sooner than they would have otherwise, and to subsequently return to the family home post-arrest because they lack the resources to live on their own.¹⁰⁷ People who were arrested left home 6.3 months earlier and returned home 2.4 months earlier on average than those with no system contact.¹⁰⁸ Returning to the family home nearly doubled in the month after an arrest.¹⁰⁹ For those with an arrest history, returning home in any given month following an arrest increased by 31 percent.¹¹⁰ But an arrest can also cause young adults to leave their family homes prematurely. Leaving the family home increased by 42.3 percent in the month following an arrest and leaving home in any given month increased by 11.7 percent for people with an arrest history compared to those with no arrest.¹¹¹ An arrest may warp the transition to adulthood by creating residential shocks that exacerbate housing instability. For instance, those who have been arrested can be barred from public housing, and family members in public housing risk eviction if they permit a relative with an arrest record to reside in the home.¹¹² The families of young adults who are arrested may also be forced to allocate resources toward legal system costs rather than helping their children achieve independence.

Civic and Social Engagement

Nearly one-quarter of people in the United States interact in some way with police every year, making law enforcement one of the most visible facets of government in people’s everyday lives.¹¹³ The way police interact with people conveys the value government places on their lives, property, and overall well-being. People who have negative encounters with law enforcement can feel that they lack agency in shaping the way the state operates, which in turn fosters disengagement and alienation that makes participation in civic and social life less likely.¹¹⁴ In

recent years, high-profile incidents of police violence in places like Ferguson, Missouri, and Minneapolis—and ensuing protests across the country—have been the most visible manifestations of public outrage over abusive policing. But what police do on a daily basis—like making routine street and traffic stops and arrests for misdemeanor offenses—also erodes trust in vital social and civic institutions.

Extensive research demonstrates that the experiences people have with civic and criminal legal institutions impact their perceptions of government and their participation in democracy.¹¹⁵ How government actors treat people—and whether people believe that treatment to be fair—shapes what people do when they need help, whether they participate in community institutions and services, and whether they engage with the democratic process at all.

Arrests can reduce voting, while police stops may catalyze demands for political change even as they reduce trust in government

In a 2010 article, researchers Vesla M. Weaver and Amy E. Lerman found that punitive interactions between police and the public are a “primary site of civic education” that “depress political engagement.”¹¹⁶ They found that arrests had a significant negative impact on several aspects of political engagement, including trust in government, voter registration, and voter turnout. Their analysis of one nationally representative survey found that people who had been arrested were 27.1 percent less likely to vote and 9 percent less likely to have trust in government than people with no arrest.¹¹⁷ Weaver and Lerman’s examination of another survey found that people who had been arrested were 36.6 percent less likely to be registered to vote and 43.2 percent less likely to vote.¹¹⁸ Their results indicated, however, that being stopped and questioned by police had two discrete effects on people: those stopped were 14 percent less likely to have trust in government, but they were simultaneously 43 percent *more* likely to participate politically.¹¹⁹

Police killings of civilians can mobilize voting among Black and Latinx people

In a study set in Los Angeles, researchers Desmond Ang and Jonathan Tebes found that each time a police officer killed a civilian, there was a 5 percent increase in registration and voting in the following election in census blocks where the killing occurred, compared to neighboring census blocks.¹²⁰ This increase in voter registration continued for more than a decade after the

killing and was driven by the increased likelihood of Black (8 percent more likely) and Latinx (5 percent more likely) community members registering to vote.¹²¹ The voting behavior of white and Asian people in the same census blocks remained unchanged.¹²² The authors also found that police killings of unarmed people were far more likely to lead to voting registration gains and support for ballot measures related to criminal legal reform than killings of armed people.¹²³

As the increase in voter turnout following police shootings suggests, police intrusion and violence can spark political engagement not because it is desirable or inspires faith in government, but because it fractures it. Outrage over acts of police violence or injustice can mobilize demands for political change, while more routine encounters, like an arrest, can stunt voting and trust in government.

Arrests and street stops can undermine engagement with local government and disrupt informal community problem-solving

Lerman and Weaver analyzed 3 million 311 calls in New York City as a measure of civic engagement with the government and found that, in general, as police stops of pedestrians increased, 311 service requests increased.¹²⁴ The authors took this as an indication that people are more willing to engage with government when they see government actively engaged in their neighborhood.¹²⁵ However, the researchers found that “surplus stops”—in which people are searched or have force used against them without being arrested—led to smaller increases in 311 calls, and even led to people making fewer safety- or crime-related 311 calls.¹²⁶ Furthermore, police stops in neighborhoods with a higher concentration of Black and Latinx and low-income residents were only half as likely to see increased 311 call volume.¹²⁷ The study also checked 311 call rates against two benchmarks: the average number of surplus force stops police conducted and the number of such stops that would be expected in a precinct where residents shared the same demographic characteristics as residents in the observed neighborhoods.¹²⁸ Calls to 311 decreased in precincts with above average and above expected numbers of surplus force stops.¹²⁹ These findings suggest that communities distinguish between the types of stops police make—engaging with government more when police make effective stops but retreating from engagement in the face of unnecessary stop-and-frisk encounters.

A study by researcher Amie Schuck found that the intensification of enforcement for low-level misdemeanor crimes in Chicago impedes communities’ ability to resolve minor conflicts and create a safe and orderly environment without state intervention.¹³⁰ To measure informal social control—the individual and collective internalization of social rules and norms that shape behavior—the study used a four-item scale developed from prior research. Respondents were surveyed about how likely their neighbors would be to intervene if children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building; if a fight broke out in front of their house and someone was being

beaten; if children were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner; or if the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts. Survey results indicated that a 1 percent increase in low-level arrests was associated with a 1.5 percent decrease in the ability of neighborhoods to manage disorder and organize to protect vital social services.¹³¹ Neighborhoods with the highest rates of low-level arrests had 25 percent “less capacity for informal social control” compared to residents in neighborhoods with the lowest arrest rates for the same offenses.¹³²

An arrest can suppress people’s engagement with community and social institutions like banks, hospitals, and schools

Researcher Sarah Brayne developed the theory of “system avoidance” based on the impact of criminal legal system contact (specifically measuring police stops and arrests) on a person’s willingness to engage with social institutions.¹³³ The formal records generated after contact with police may increase the risk of system-impacted people being monitored, rearrested, or otherwise punished if they engage with private institutions or public welfare agencies that track and assess this information. As a result, people may refrain from accessing these services. The paper found that people who were stopped and questioned or arrested by the police decreased their formal interactions with important social and welfare institutions such as medical, financial, civic, and educational institutions.¹³⁴ People with an arrest had 29 percent lower odds of having a bank account, 30 percent higher odds of being out of work or school, and a 29 percent greater chance of failing to obtain medical care when needed.¹³⁵ People who were stopped and questioned but not arrested had a 33 percent greater chance of failing to obtain medical care when needed.¹³⁶ On the other hand, arrests had no statistically significant effect on relationships with “non-surveilling institutions,” such as volunteer and religious organizations.¹³⁷

Conclusion

This brief provides a comprehensive review of the body of evidence on the social costs of policing. Research consistently demonstrates that policing has collateral consequences that harm the health, educational development, economic well-being, and civic and social engagement of individuals, families, and neighborhoods. In light of this evidence, public policy debates about the role and effectiveness of policing in creating public safety must consider the downsides of policing interventions. The evidence also shows that the social costs of policing are borne more heavily by Black people, who have faced a history of discrimination and violence at the hands of law enforcement. Black communities that have suffered from both under-

protection and disinvestment have the most to gain from public safety strategies that account for the social costs of policing, and the most to lose from ignoring these harms.

Law enforcement practices can impact social well-being even when people have no direct contact with police. Policing has ancillary effects that reverberate through communities and can linger for many years across the lifetime of residents. Furthermore, policing can cause social harm even absent a negative encounter. This reflects the limitations of relying solely on efforts to reduce individual instances of police misconduct and violence to curb policing's social costs. Ultimately, policymakers must recognize that there are quantifiable social costs to current policing approaches and factor this evidence into decisions on public safety investments.

(Appendix A) About the Social Costs of Policing Literature: Methods and Data

This evidence brief consists of four sections reviewing a combined 46 quantitative empirical studies published from 1998 to March 1, 2021, in peer-reviewed journals across a variety of disciplines, including sociology, economics, political science, criminology, and epidemiology. Only studies focused on the United States, using quantitative methods, assessing a policing intervention such as arrest as the key treatment variable, peer-reviewed, and published in the last 25 years were included. Although Vera included a 25-year time period, nearly all the included studies were published in the past five years.

To identify relevant studies for this evidence brief, Vera began by establishing a set of search terms and accessed several academic search engines and databases to conduct a comprehensive survey of the literature. Vera researchers then conducted a title and abstract screening to remove irrelevant results. Remaining studies were read in full to determine which met the inclusion criteria. Vera researchers checked citations and reference lists in each included study to identify research that was not located in Vera's original search. Included studies were subsequently uploaded to Zotero and tagged to generate a working bibliography and observe patterns in the literature for this review. Vera grouped the studies into thematic areas, four of which arose: economic well-being, health, educational development, and civic engagement.

During the citation checking process, Vera found four working papers that otherwise met our inclusion criteria: Geller, "Policing America's Children"; Ang and Tebes, "Civic Responses to Police Violence"; Del Toro et al., "The Health Related"; and Bacher Hicks and De la Campa, "Social Costs." We determined that these studies were rigorous enough to meet our standard for inclusion, but identify them here as not having yet undergone full peer review. Final peer-reviewed versions of these papers may have been published since the release of this evidence brief.

There are some studies that are related to the research reviewed in this evidence brief, but which Vera ultimately excluded. For example, there is a robust literature on the criminogenic

effects of criminal legal system contact, including with law enforcement. However, because the purpose of this evidence brief is to expand knowledge of public safety cost-benefit analysis beyond crime reduction, this literature was not included. In addition, researchers excluded studies that looked at the social costs of criminal legal system contact but did not clearly disaggregate the effects of policing from other forms of system exposure. Finally, researchers excluded studies that did not measure the effects of policing on a specific dimension of individual or population-level well-being, but rather on complex social phenomena such as gentrification.

The studies Vera reviewed analyze both longitudinal and cross-sectional data at the individual, neighborhood, and population levels, and use robust multivariate regression analyses and models, including difference-in-differences and synthetic control approaches. Although many of the studies use large, stratified, multi-wave nationally representative surveys like the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Fragile Families & Child Wellbeing Study,¹³⁸ others assessed more local survey data or records and employed quasi-experimental designs including experimental audit methods, or supplemental approaches such as qualitative focus groups. Researchers integrated data sets from a diverse range of sources, including administrative data, surveys, and health care, education, social welfare, and criminal legal records.

(Appendix B) The Social Costs of Policing Study Matrix

This table lists the studies Vera reviewed in preparing the Social Costs of Policing report. It can be accessed online at <https://www.vera.org/publications/the-social-costs-of-policing>.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank their colleague Benjamin Heller, whose thorough feedback and edits made this evidence brief possible. They are also grateful to Nina Siulc, Ed Chung, and Cindy Reed for their review and comments and to Lisha Nadkarni for editing and Tammy Ackerson and EpsteinWords for editorial support. This report has been made possible in part by funding from Bank of New York Mellon.

Credits

© Vera Institute of Justice 2022. All rights reserved.

An electronic version of this report is posted on Vera's website at <https://www.vera.org/publications/the-social-costs-of-policing>.

The Vera Institute of Justice is powered by hundreds of advocates, researchers, and policy experts working to transform the criminal legal and immigration systems until they're fair for all. Founded in 1961 to advocate for alternatives to money bail in New York City, Vera is now a national organization that partners with impacted communities and government leaders for change. We develop just, antiracist solutions so that money doesn't determine freedom; fewer people are in jails, prisons, and immigration detention; and everyone is treated with dignity. Vera's headquarters is in Brooklyn, New York, with offices in Washington, DC, New Orleans, and Los Angeles.

For more information about this report, contact Daniela Gilbert, director, Redefining Public Safety, at dgilbert@vera.org.

Notes

¹ Eugenio Weigend Vargas, "The Recent Rise in Violent Crime is Driven by Gun Violence," Center for American Progress, June 3, 2022, <https://perma.cc/7LUV-P9YT>; Richard Rosenfeld and Ernesto Lopez, "Pandemic, Social Unrest, and Crime in U.S. Cities: Mid-Year 2022 Update," Council on Criminal Justice, July 22, 2022, <https://counciloncj.org/mid-year-2022-crime-trends>.

² In recent years, scholars have begun to examine the social costs of policing and critique traditional ways of assessing police cost-effectiveness. See German Lopez, "America Needs to Think More about the Costs of Policing," Vox, June 4, 2020, <https://perma.cc/QQ6M-DS3C>; John Pfaff, "Policing Studies Measure Benefits to Crime Reduction—But Not Social Costs," The Appeal, October 2, 2020, <https://perma.cc/Z4VF-D42B>; Monica Bell, "Black Security and the Conundrum of Policing," Just Security, July 15, 2020, <https://perma.cc/RPU8-WR2F>; Ryan Fackler, Christian Henrichson, Elizabeth Janszky, and S. Rebecca Neusteter, "Closing the Gap: The Need for Inclusive Benefit-Cost Analysis in Policing," *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 8, no. 3 (2017), 330–338, <https://perma.cc/ALS4-TQ5T>; Susan A. Bandes, Marie Pryor, Erin M. Kerrison, and Phillip Atiba Goff, "The Mismeasure of *Terry* Stops: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Harms of Stop and Frisk to Individuals and Communities," *Behavioral Sciences & the Law* 37, no. 2 (2019), 176–194, <https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2401>; Jake Horowitz and Edwin Zedlewski, "Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Policing Evaluations," *Justice Research and Policy* 8, no. 1 (2006), 51–65, <https://doi.org/10.3818/JRP.8.1.2006.51>.

³ American Public Health Association, "Addressing Law Enforcement Violence as a Public Health Issue," Policy No. 201811, November 13, 2018, <https://perma.cc/W4PT-JRGD>; Hannah L.F. Cooper and Mindy Fullilove, "Excessive Police Violence as a Public Health Issue," *Journal of Urban Health* 93 (2016), 51–57, <https://perma.cc/8SEK-TX59>; Hannah Cooper, Lisa Moore, Sofia Gruskin, and Nancy Krieger, "Characterizing Perceived Police Violence: Implications for Public Health," *American Journal of Public Health* 94, no. 7 (2004), 1109–1118,

<https://perma.cc/Z6Y6-UW9H>; Sirry Alang, Donna McAlpine, Ellen McCreedy, and Rachel Hardeman, “Police Brutality and Black Health: Setting the Agenda for Public Health Scholars,” *American Journal of Public Health* 107, no. 5 (2017), 662–665, <https://perma.cc/EGK8-ULGN>; Susan Nembhard and Krista White, “It’s Time to Declare Racism a Public Health Issue,” *Urban Wire*, Urban Institute, November 11, 2020, <https://perma.cc/V9KS-MVLL>.

⁴ Vera Institute of Justice, “Arrest Trends,” <https://arresttrends.vera.org/>.

⁵ Washington State Institute for Public Policy, “Deploy One Additional Police Officer with Statewide Average Practices,” December 2019, <https://perma.cc/LS9N-B8AD>; Aaron Chafin and Justin McCrary, “Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory & Evidence,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 100, no. 1 (2018), 167–186, author working copy available at <https://perma.cc/UQF9-BZ64>; Paul Heaton, *Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell Us About Investing in Police* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), <https://perma.cc/34B5-26LD>.

⁶ To the extent that research has traditionally considered policing’s collateral consequences, it does so primarily through the lens of public trust in law enforcement and police legitimacy, rather than capturing the negative effects that police have on social well-being in communities. Research in this vein often evaluates whether police use of force or “broken windows” policing damages police-community relations. It also assesses whether police might exacerbate crime, by testing theories like legal cynicism, an orientation in which “the law and the agents of its enforcement are viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to ensure public safety,” causing people to be less likely to report crime, participate in criminal investigations, and engage in collective action to maintain social order. See David S. Kirk and Mauri Matsuda, “Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest,” *Criminology* 49, no. 2 (2011), 443–472, <https://perma.cc/EK7B-UKHB>. This occurs in practice as well as research: President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing positioned damaged police-community relations as the central collateral cost of failure by law enforcement institutions, with improved procedural justice as the goal. See Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing Implementation Guide: Moving from Recommendations to Action* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), <https://perma.cc/GU4U-KSSS>. For a critical perspective on this approach to police reform, see Monica C. Bell, “Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,” *Yale Law Journal* 126 (2017), 2054–2150, <https://perma.cc/Q8C5-5DNX>.

⁷ See: Joscha Legewie and Jeffrey Fagan, “Aggressive Policing and the Educational Performance of Minority Youth,” *American Sociological Review* 84, no. 2 (2019), 220–247, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003122419826020>.

⁸ For a review of evidence-based non-carceral responses to violent crime, see Jennifer Doleac and Anna Harvey, “Stemming Violence by Investing in Civic Goods,” *Vital City*, March 2, 2022, <https://perma.cc/NUH6-H8J2>; John Jay College Research Advisory Group on Preventing and Reducing Community Violence, *Reducing Violence without Police: A Review of Research Evidence* (New York: Research and Evaluation Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, 2020), <https://perma.cc/MCN6-EMSZ>.

⁹ Jacob Bor, Atheendar S. Venkataramani, David R. Williams, and Alexander C. Tsai, “Police Killings and Their Spillover Effects on the Mental Health of Black Americans: A Population-

Based, Quasi-Experimental Study,” *The Lancet* 392, no. 10144 (2018), 302–310, 306, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140673618311309?via%3Dihub>.

¹⁰ Ibid., 308.

¹¹ Ibid., 307. Recently, two researchers issued a rebuttal reply to this paper that examined the coding of incidents which were used to evaluate causality. They argued that 91 incidents should have been removed or recoded prior to analysis, which would have reduced the magnitude of reported coefficients and eliminated the statistically significant effect. There is an ongoing debate about the methodology and findings in this study. For Nix and Lozada rebuttal, see Justin Nix and M.J. Lozada, “Police Killings of Unarmed Black Americans: A Reassessment of Community Mental Health Spillover Effects,” *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal* 22, no. 3 (2021), 1330–1339,

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15614263.2021.1878894>. For Bor et al.’s reply to Nix and Lozada rebuttal, see Jacob Bor, Atheendar S. Venkataramani, David Williams, and Alexander C. Tsai, “Reply to Nix and Lozada (2020), ‘Do Police Killings of Unarmed Persons Really Have Spillover Effects? Reanalyzing Bor et al. (2018),’” January 23, 2020, <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/h6y5w/>. [Note: the initial rebuttal was accepted for publication after the response was written, and the response has not yet been published at the time of writing this brief, leading to the apparent misordering of dates.]

¹² Desmond Ang, “The Effects of Police Violence on Inner-City Students,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136, no. 1 (2021), 115–168, 117, author [working copy available at https://perma.cc/7MCF-5XNJ](#). The study found that students are anywhere from 0.04 to 0.07 percentage points more likely to be classified as having ED in the semester following a police killing (114). Although the effect size was small, it was highly significant, reflecting an estimated 15 percentage point increase over the mean number of students classified with ED in a given year, with little decline several semesters after exposure. The paper suggests that, given the relationship between violence, cortisol levels, and test performance, the psychological trauma spurred by police killings may be one mechanism that explains the decrease in GPA observed in this study (142). Because students with ED are also 50 percent less likely to graduate, police violence may also have long-term effects that are implicit in the results of this study but beyond its direct scope.

¹³ Jordan E. DeVlyder, Courtney D. Cogburn, Hans Y. Oh, et al., “Psychotic Experiences in the Context of Police Victimization: Data from the Survey of Police-Public Encounters,” *Schizophrenia Bulletin* 43, no. 5 (2017), 993–1001, 997,

<https://academic.oup.com/schizophreniabulletin/article/43/5/993/3074859>; Jordan E.

DeVlyder, Jodi J. Frey, Courtney D. Cogburn, et al., “Elevated Prevalence of Suicide Attempts among Victims of Police Violence in the USA,” *Journal of Urban Health* 94, no. 5 (2017), 629–636, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-017-0160-3>; Jordan E. DeVlyder, Hyun-

Jin Jun, Lisa Fedina, et al., “Association of Exposure to Police Violence with Prevalence of Mental Health Symptoms among Urban Residents in the United States,” *JAMA Network Open* 1, no. 7 (2018), <https://perma.cc/HPH2-JJW3>.

¹⁴ DeVlyder, Cogburn, Oh, et al., “Psychotic Experiences,” 997.

¹⁵ DeVlyder, Frey, Cogburn, et al., “Elevated Prevalence of Suicide Attempts,” 631.

¹⁶ Nicholas A. Smith, Dexter R. Voisin, Joyce P. Yang, and Elizabeth L. Tung, “Keeping Your Guard Up: Hypervigilance among Urban Residents Affected by Community and Police Violence,” *Health Affairs* 38, no. 10 (2019), 1662–1669,

<https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00560>.

-
- ¹⁷ “Hypervigilance,” APA Dictionary of Psychology, <https://dictionary.apa.org/hypervigilance>.
- ¹⁸ Smith, Voisin, Yang, Tung, “Keeping Your Guard Up,” 1666. Hypervigilance was measured using the Brief Hypervigilance Scale. Scoring 20 points higher (on a 100-point scale), on average, was clinically associated with PTSD compared to no PTSD (1664).
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 1666.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 1667.
- ²¹ Christopher R. Browning, Jake Tarrence, Eric LaPlant, et al., “Exposure to Police-Related Deaths and Physiological Stress among Urban Black Youth,” *Psychoneuroendocrinology* 125 (2021), 1–10, 7, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306453020303073?via%3Dihub>.
- ²² Ibid., 6–7.
- ²³ Amanda Geller, “Policing America’s Children: Police Contact and Consequences among Teens in Fragile Families,” Fragile Families working paper WP18-02-FF (2017), <https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf2001/files/wp18-02-ff.pdf>.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ The research Vera reviewed is mixed on whether more stops lead to increasingly worse mental health outcomes.
- ²⁶ Dylan B. Jackson, Chantal Fahmy, Michael G. Vaughn, and Alexander Testa, “Police Stops among At-Risk Youth: Repercussions for Mental Health,” *Journal of Adolescent Health* 65, no. 5 (2019), 627–632, 630, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1054139X19303349?via%3Dihub>.
- ²⁷ Jaquelyn L. Jahn, Madina Agenor, Jarvis T. Chen, and Nancy Krieger, “Frequent Police Stops, Parental Incarceration and Mental Health: Results among U.S. Non-Hispanic Black and White Adolescent Girls and Boys,” *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health* 75, no. 7 (2021), 658–664, 661–662, <https://jech.bmj.com/content/75/7/658> (including corrections of December 2021).
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Dylan B. Jackson, Alexander Testa, Michael G. Vaughn, and Daniel C. Semenza, “Police Stops and Sleep Behaviors among At-Risk Youth,” *Sleep Health* 6, no. 4 (2020), 435–441, 437, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2352721820300711?via%3Dihub>.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 437.
- ³¹ Ibid., 437.
- ³² Amber Landers, David Rollock, Charity Rolfes, and Demietrice Moore, “Police Contacts and Stress among African American College Students,” *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 81, no. 1 (2011), 72–81, <https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1111%2Fj.1939-0025.2010.01073.x>; Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler, and Bruce G. Link, “Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men,” *American Journal of Public Health* 104, no. 12 (2014), 2321–2327, <https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2014.302046>; J.L. Hirschtick, S.M. Homan, G. Rauscher, et al., “Persistent and Aggressive Interactions with the Police: Potential Mental Health Implications,” *Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences* 29 (2020), e19, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/epidemiology-and-psychiatric-sciences/article/persistent-and-aggressive-interactions-with-the-police-potential-mental-health-implications/08A72C424643BA06BF558E579CC30312>.
- ³³ Abigail A. Sewell, Kevin A. Jefferson, and Hedwig Lee, “Living under Surveillance: Gender, Psychological Distress, and Stop-Question-and-Frisk Policing in New York City,” *Social Science & Medicine* 159 (2016), 1–13, 8–9,

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953616301988?via%3Dihub>; the Stop, Question and Frisk database contains publicly available data reported by the NYPD on stop, question, and frisk rates by race and ethnicity and other variables dating from 2003 to 2020. City of New York Police Department, “Stop, Question and Frisk Data,” database, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/stopfrisk.page>.

³⁴ Ibid., 8.

³⁵ Sewell, Jefferson, and Lee, “Living under Surveillance,” 6.

³⁶ Abigail A. Sewell and Kevin A. Jefferson, “Collateral Damage: The Health Effects of Invasive Police Encounters in New York City,” *Journal of Urban Health* 93, no. S1 (2016), 42–67, 550, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-015-0016-7>. When the paper examined ethnoracial differences in health effects the findings were mixed.

³⁷ Sirry Alang, Donna McAlpine, and Malcolm McClain, “Police Encounters as Stressors: Associations with Depression and Anxiety across Race,” *Socius* 7 (2021), 1–13, 5–6, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2378023121998128>.

³⁸ Hirschtick et al., “Persistent and Aggressive,” 1, 3.

³⁹ Naomi F. Sugie and Kristin Turney, “Beyond Incarceration: Criminal Justice Contact and Mental Health,” *American Sociological Review* 82, no. 4 (2017), 719–743, 728, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003122417713188>.

⁴⁰ Alyssa Fowers and William Wan, “Depression and Anxiety Spiked among Black Americans after George Floyd’s Death,” *Washington Post*, June 12, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/06/12/mental-health-george-floyd-census/?arc404=true>.

⁴¹ Abhery Das, Parvati Singh, Anju K. Kulkarni, and Tim A. Bruckner, “Emergency Department Visits for Depression following Police Killings of Unarmed African Americans,” *Social Science & Medicine* 269 (2021), 1–6, 4, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953620307802?via%3Dihub>.

⁴² Lisa Bowleg, Ana Maria del Río-González, Mary Mbaba, Cheriko A. Boone, and Sidney L. Holt, “Negative Police Encounters and Police Avoidance as Pathways to Depressive Symptoms among U.S. Black Men, 2015–2016,” *American Journal of Public Health* 110, no. S1 (2020), S160–S166, <https://perma.cc/5T8V-YU2P?view-mode=server-side&type=image>.

⁴³ Sophie I. Leib, Emma C. Faith, Samuel R. Vincent, and Steven A. Miller, “Police Interactions, Perceived Respect, and Longitudinal Changes in Depression in African Americans,” *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 40, no. 1 (2021), 27–45, 39–40, <https://guilfordjournals.com/doi/10.1521/jscp.2021.40.1.27>.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 36–37.

⁴⁵ Fleda Mask Jackson, Sherman A. James, Tracy Curry Owens, and Alpha F. Bryant, “Anticipated Negative Police-Youth Encounters and Depressive Symptoms among Pregnant African American Women: A Brief Report,” *Journal of Urban Health* 94, no. 2 (2017), 259–265, 259, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11524-017-0136-3>.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 263.

⁴⁷ Dylan B. Jackson and Kristin Turney, “Sleep Problems among Mothers of Youth Stopped by the Police,” *Journal of Urban Health* 98, no. 2 (2021), 163–171, 166, <https://perma.cc/JML2-P9PH>. For a similar paper by one of the same authors using the same data set, see Kristin Turney, “The Mental Health Consequences of Vicarious Adolescent Police Exposure,” *Social Forces* 100, no. 3 (2021), <https://academic.oup.com/sf/article-abstract/100/3/1142/6274881>.

⁴⁸ Jackson and Turney, “Sleep Problems,” 166.

⁴⁹ Alang, McAlpine, and McClain, “Police Encounters as Stressors,” 5–6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 5–7.

⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

⁵² Elizabeth Hinton, LeShae Henderson, and Cindy Reed, *An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice System* (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2018), <https://perma.cc/FT47-AVS2>; Drew DeSilver, Michael Lipka, and Dalia Fahmy, “10 Things We Know about Race and Policing in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, June 3, 2020, <https://perma.cc/32F2-58AH>; Radley Balko, “There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof,” *Washington Post*, June 10, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/#Policing>; Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, et al., “A Large-Scale Analysis Of Racial Disparities In Police Stops across the United States,” *Nature Human Behavior* 4 (2020), 736–745, <https://perma.cc/X43G-SLBQ>.

⁵³ Seven of the nine studies revealed statistically significant findings. See Jön Bernburg and Marvin Krohn, “Labeling, Life Chances, and Adult Crime: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Official Intervention in Adolescence on Crime in Early Adulthood,” *Criminology* 41, no. 4 (2003), 1287–1318, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2003.tb01020.x>; Paul Hirschfield, “Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High School Dropout,” *Sociology of Education* 82, no. 4 (2009), 368–393, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/003804070908200404>; David S. Kirk and Robert J. Sampson, “Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage in the Transition to Adulthood,” *Sociology of Education* 86, no. 1 (2013), 36–62, <https://perma.cc/T7ZK-FA4R>; Alex O. Widdowson, Sonja E. Siennick, and Carter Hay, “The Implications of Arrest for College Enrollment: An Analysis of Long-Term Effects and Mediating Mechanisms,” *Criminology* 54, no. 4 (2016), 621–652, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9125.12114>; Desmond Ang, “The Effects of Police Violence on Inner-City Students,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136, no. 1 (2021), 115–168, author [working copy available at https://perma.cc/7MCF-5XNJ](https://perma.cc/7MCF-5XNJ); Andrew Bacher-Hicks and Elijah de la Campa, “Social Costs of Proactive Policing: The Impact of NYC’s Stop and Frisk Program on Educational Attainment,” working paper version February 26, 2020, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sSxhfmDY3N1VAN5XwyRObE65tmAZzhTj/view>; Giza Lopes, Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, et al., “Labeling and Cumulative Disadvantage: The Impact of Formal Police Intervention on Life Chances and Crime During Emerging Adulthood,” *Crime & Delinquency* 58, no. 3 (2012), 456–488, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0011128712436414>. The two remaining studies found negative effects with a margin of error too large for statistical significance due to methodological issues. See Gary Sweeten, “Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement,” *Justice Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (2006), 462–480, <https://perma.cc/8NWZ-Z5S8>; Randi Hjalmarsson, “Criminal Justice Involvement and High School Completion,” *Journal of Urban Economics* 63, no. 2 (2008), 613–630, author working copy available at <https://perma.cc/4KSA-WBC6>. Subsequent study designs reduced selection bias, adopted quasi-experimental analyses, and corrected for other issues to improve measurement reliability and solidify the evidence for causal inference.

⁵⁴ Bernburg and Krohn, “Labeling, Life Chances,” 1300.

⁵⁵ Hirschfield, “Another Way Out,” 381.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 384.

⁵⁷ Lopes, Krohn, Lizotte, et al., “Labeling and Cumulative Disadvantage,” 474.

⁵⁸ Widdowson, Siennick, and Hay, “The Implications of Arrest for College Enrollment,” 632.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 633–634.

⁶⁰ Legewie and Fagan, “Aggressive Policing;” Ang, “The Effects of Police Violence”; Aaron Gottlieb and Robert Wilson, “The Effect of Direct and Vicarious Police Contact on the Educational Achievement of Urban Teens,” *Children and Youth Services Review* 103 (2019), 190–199,

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0190740919302099?via%3Dihub>;

Juan Del Toro, Alvin Thomas, Ming-Te Wang, and Diane Hughes, “The Health-Related Consequences to Police Stops as Pathways to Risks in Academic Performance for Urban Adolescents,” Fragile Families working paper WP19-09-FF (2019), <https://perma.cc/7FWA-R4X7>; Katharine H. Zeiders, Adriana J. Umaña-Taylor, Selena Carbajal, Alexandria Pech, “Police Discrimination among Black, Latina/x/o, and White Adolescents: Examining Frequency and Relations to Academic Functioning,” *Journal of Adolescence* 90 (2021), 91–99, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1016/j.adolescence.2021.06.001>.

⁶¹ Legewie and Fagan, “Aggressive Policing,” 225–226.

⁶² Ibid. Operation Impact sent staggered surges of recent police academy graduates to designated “impact zones” which were selected based on “a combination of [crime statistics], police intelligence and data analytics.” An impact zone was designated as an area where there was an increase in the intensity of police activity of about 30 percent in pedestrian stops or arrests for low-level crimes. The NYPD reanalyzed crime data to shift and modify impact zone locations every six months. Due to limited observational data, the authors restricted their sample to African American and Hispanic students ages 9 to 15.

⁶³ Ibid., 238.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 231.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 232. The study also found that Operation Impact may have had an indirect positive effect on educational outcomes via reductions of approximately 5 percent on violent crime compared to control zones (237). However, these potential benefits ended when an area ceased to be an impact zone, with violent crime levels returning to their previous levels. On the other hand, the negative effect of Operation Impact on school performance, although declining in strength, continued to be statistically significant for at least two years after the program’s conclusion, leading the authors to conclude that the crime control benefits of Operation Impact on education were “far exceeded by the negative consequences.”

⁶⁶ Kirk and Sampson, “Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage,” 54 (“73 percent of those arrested later dropped out of high school compared with 51 percent of those not arrested”).

⁶⁷ Ang, “The Effects of Police Violence,” 162.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 161. This study’s results are consistent with an extensive literature describing the negative effects on educational performance of exposure to violent crime. However, this study found that a police killing had an effect approximately twice as large as the effect of a criminal homicide, although the effects would not be equal in aggregate given the lower volume of killings by police (26–27).

⁶⁹ Ibid., 143.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 135–136.

⁷¹ Bacher-Hicks and de la Campa, “Social Costs of Proactive Policing.”

⁷² Bacher-Hicks and de la Campa, “Social Costs of Proactive Policing,” 20–21.

⁷³ Ibid., 3. The study also found that increases in students’ self-reported fear in school suggested that psychological and emotional distress associated with police stops may drive students to disengage from formal education, and that this outcome was higher in schools with a greater proportion of Black students (4). The authors used data from the annual NYC Learning

Environment survey where middle school students responded to two relevant prompts: “I am safe in my classes” and “I am safe on school property outside my school building”; responses were recorded on a four-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (26).

⁷⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 25.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 23.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 27–28.

⁷⁸ Gottlieb and Wilson, “The Effect of Direct and Vicarious Police Contact,” 17–18.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 18. The authors created a measure for vicarious police contact by combining total affirmative answers to three questions (12). The following questions and related response data were drawn from the Fragile Families survey. Respondents who answered yes to any of these questions were coded as having vicarious contact: 1. “Have you ever seen someone stopped by the police in your neighborhood?” 2. “Have you ever seen someone stopped by the police in your school?” 3. “Do you know anyone who has been stopped by the police?” McLanahan, Garfinkel, Waldfogel, and Edin, “Fragile Families.” This is a similar methodology to that used in Geller, Fagan, Tyler, and Link, “Aggressive Policing”; and Geller, “Policing America’s Children.”

⁸⁰ Del Toro, Thomas, Wang, and Hughes, “The Health-Related Consequences,” 33–34.

⁸¹ Shawn D. Bushway, Irineo Cabrereros, Jessica Welburn Paige, et al., “Barred from Employment: More than Half of Unemployed Men in Their 30s Had a Criminal History of Arrest,” *Science Advances* 8, no. 7 (2022), 1–10, <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abj6992>; Shawn D. Bushway and Jeffrey B. Wenger, “Op-Ed: Why Unemployed Men with Criminal Records Could Be Key to Solving the U.S. Labor Shortage,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 22, 2022, <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-02-22/labor-shortage-men-unemployed-criminal-record-hire>.

⁸² Shawn D. Bushway, “The Impact of an Arrest on the Job Stability of Young White American Men,” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 35, no. 4 (1998), 454–479, 475–476, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022427898035004005>. The impacts of arrest on employment may be relatively short-term, as another measure in the study looking at employment stability—defined as whether a person worked one job in a year for 40 weeks or more or worked more than one job but had worked for at least a year at a previous job—found no statistically significant effects (476).

⁸³ Lopes, Krohn, Lizotte, et al., “Labeling and Cumulative Disadvantage,” 465–466.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 471.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 480.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 471.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 474–475.

⁸⁸ Alexandra Killewald, Fabian T. Pfeffer, and Jared N. Schachner, “Wealth Inequality and Accumulation,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 43 (2017), 379–404, <https://perma.cc/E7VD-H2GF>; Caroline Ratcliffe, Brett Theodos, Signe-Mary McKernan, et al., *Debt in America* (Washington, DC and San Diego, CA: The Urban Institute and the Consumer Credit Research Institute, 2014), <https://perma.cc/E5QU-P4TU>; Signe-Mary McKernan, Caroline Ratcliffe, C. Eugene Steuerle, and Sisi Zhang, *Less Than Equal: Racial Disparities in Wealth Accumulation* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute 2013), <https://perma.cc/U8VP-LT55>; Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, “Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap,” Up Front Blog, The Brookings Institution (2020), <https://perma.cc/7XT2-9YZ2>; Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling, and Joanne W. Hsu, “Disparities in Wealth by Race and

Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances,” *FEDS Notes*, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 28, 2020, <https://perma.cc/76SX-MDGR>; Melvin Thomas, Cedric Herring, Hayward Derrick Horton, et al., “Race and the Accumulation of Wealth: Racial Differences in Net Worth over the Life Course, 1989–2009,” *Social Problems* 67, no. 1 (2020), 20–39, <https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spz002>.

⁸⁹ Louise Seamster, “Black Debt, White Debt,” *Contexts* 18, no. 1 (2019), 30–35, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1536504219830674>; Sharmila Choudhury, “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth and Asset Choices,” *Social Security Bulletin* 64, no. 4 (2001/2002), <https://perma.cc/QLZ9-PJAN>.

⁹⁰ Jason N. Houle, “A Generation Indebted: Young Adult Debt across Three Cohorts,” *Social Problems* 61, no. 3 (2014), 448–465, <https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article-abstract/61/3/448/1643684>; Randy Hodson, Rachel E. Dwyer, and Lisa A. Neilson, “Credit Card Blues: The Middle Class and the Hidden Cost of Easy Credit,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (2014), 315–349, <https://perma.cc/T6HY-SFM8>; Ratcliffe, Theodos, and McKernan, “Debt in America.”

⁹¹ Michelle Maroto and Bryan L. Sykes, “The Varying Effects of Incarceration, Conviction, and Arrest on Wealth Outcomes among Young Adults,” *Social Problems* 67, no. 4 (2020), 698–718, 703, <https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article-abstract/67/4/698/5538627>.

⁹² Ngina S. Chiteji, “To Have and to Hold: An Analysis of Young Adult Debt,” in *The Price of Independence: The Economics of Early Adulthood* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008), 231–258, <https://nyuscholars.nyu.edu/en/publications/to-have-and-to-hold-an-analysis-of-young-adult-debt>; Laura Feiveson and John Sabelhaus, “Lifecycle Patterns of Saving and Wealth Accumulation” (Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019), <https://perma.cc/2HAB-8Z9M>.

⁹³ Maroto and Sykes, “The Varying Effects,” 709; Maroto and Sykes also found that debt declined by 52 percent for people who were arrested between the ages of 25 and 30. However, they write, “although increased debt can become problematic, taking on debt is an integral component of wealth building. Consequently, debt tends to increase with income and education, as households borrow in order to accumulate wealth. . . . Justice system contact can also limit former offenders’ abilities to establish and maintain access to credit” (700–701).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 713.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 713–714.

⁹⁶ Brayne, “Surveillance and System Avoidance,” 385.

⁹⁷ Sonja E. Siennick and Alex O. Widdowson, “Juvenile Arrest and Later Economic Attainment: Strength and Mechanisms of the Relationship,” *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 38 (2022), 23–50, 29–30, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10940-020-09482-6>.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁰¹ Bruce Western, *Punishment and Inequality in America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006); Lucius Couloute and Daniel Kopf, “Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment among Formerly Incarcerated People,” Prison Policy Initiative, July 2018, <https://perma.cc/T5AM-KM54>; Terry-Ann Craigie, Ames Grawert, and Cameron Kimble, “Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the Criminal Justice System Deepens Inequality,” Brennan Center for Justice, September 15, 2020, <https://perma.cc/R4BH-5LCJ>; Devah Pager, *Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration* (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 2007); Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr, “The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment,” *American Economic Review* 107, no. 5 (2017), 560–564, <https://perma.cc/2CSK-QW9Z>; Naomi F. Sugie, Noah D. Katz, and Dallas Augustine, “Employer Aversion to Criminal Records: An Experimental Study of Mechanisms,” *Criminology* 58, no. 1 (2020), 5–34, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9125.12228>.

¹⁰² Pager, *Marked*, 2007; Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, “The Effect of an Applicant’s Criminal History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices: Evidence from Los Angeles,” in *Barriers to Reentry?*, edited by David Weiman, Michael A. Stoll, and Shawn D. Bushway (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007), <https://perma.cc/MC34-K9RY>.

¹⁰³ Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, et al., “The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment,” *Criminology* 52, no. 4 (2014), 627–654, 646–647, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9125.12051>. The researchers hired and trained four young male “testers,” divided into pairs of one Black and one white tester, to apply for entry-level jobs advertised in five local print newspapers in the Twin Cities metro area, for a total of nearly 300 applications per pair (632). Each week one of the pair was randomly assigned to the treatment group—reporting to employers an arrest for disorderly conduct three years in the past that did not result in a conviction. The control tester reported no criminal history.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* A one-tailed test significant at $p < .10$ revealed significant effects (642). Callback rates were significantly lower for Black testers (27.5 percent without an arrest, 23.5 percent with one) than for white testers (38.8 percent without an arrest, 34.7 percent with one) (637).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* The diversity of the employer’s workplace was a statistically significant predictor of higher Black callback rates, as was direct contact with the hiring authority (642–643). Contact with the hiring authority increased the odds of a callback 5.8 times for white people and 9.6 times for Black people (642).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 650.

¹⁰⁷ Cody Warner and Brianna Remster, “Criminal Justice Contact, Residential Independence, and Returns to the Parental Home,” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 83, no. 2 (2021), 322–339, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jomf.12753>.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 333. Examining the relationship between arrest and incarceration to determine what forms of system contact drive home-leaving, the authors found that the association between incarceration and home-leaving declined by more than 40 percent when the arrest variable was included (332). As the authors found, “A history of incarceration was not a robust predictor of boomeranging, in part because it works through arrest history, but an arrest continues to accelerate moves home long afterward” (336). The authors also state, “Having been ‘marked’ via an arrest matters more for home-returning than a history of confinement” (333).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* Those with police contact and the comparison group both left home in the six months prior to an arrest at comparable rates of 5.8 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively (329). However, in the six months after police contact, the rate at which those with police contact left home increased to 13.8 percent while the rate of home-leaving for noncontacted people remained stable. With regard to returning home, 9.5 percent of those who would be arrested returned to the parental home in the six months prior to contact, but the rate increased to 22.2 percent after contact (330). The rate of home return for those who were not arrested in the six months after contact was 12.6 percent.

¹¹² Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert, *Banished: The New Social Control in Urban America* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sarah Ryley, “The NYPD Is Kicking People Out of Their Homes, Even if They Haven’t Committed a Crime,” *ProPublica* and *New York Daily News*, February 4, 2016, <https://perma.cc/8E6M-X9VD>.

¹¹³ According to the latest data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, almost a quarter of people in the United States had contact with the police in 2018. See Erika Harrell and Elizabeth Davis, *Contacts between Police and the Public, 2018—Statistical Tables* (Washington DC: United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2020), NCJ Report 255730, Table 1, <https://perma.cc/XF8Y-CTRM>; Shannon Portillo and Danielle S. Rudes, “Construction of Justice at the Street Level,” *Annual Review of Law and Society* 10 (2014), 321–334, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102612-134046>.

¹¹⁴ Joe Soss and Vesla Weaver, “Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017), 565–591, <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060415-093825>; Traci Burch, *Trading Democracy for Justice: Criminal Convictions and the Decline of Neighborhood Political Participation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Tracey Meares, “Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase Democratic Participation,” *Northwestern University Law Review* 111, no. 6 (2017), 1525–1535, <https://perma.cc/L9FS-PHKV>.

¹¹⁵ Suzanne B. Mettler, “Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans,” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 2 (2002), 351–365, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3118030>; Suzanne B. Mettler, “Bringing Government Back into Civic Engagement: Considering the Role of Public Policy,” *International Journal of Public Administration* 30, no. 6–7 (2007), 643–650, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01900690701215987>; Suzanne B. Mettler and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, “Government Program Usage and Political Voice,” *Social Science Quarterly* 89, no. 2 (2008), 273–293, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956314>; Meares, “Policing and Procedural Justice”; Patricia Ewing and Susan S. Silbey, *The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

¹¹⁶ Vesla M. Weaver and Amy E. Lerman, “Political Consequences of the Carceral State,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 4 (2010), 817–833, 818, 830, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/political-consequences-of-the-carceral-state/4E39A3AFDAB682A1D4DE53C57E38C019>.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. Weaver and Lerman use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) and Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study surveys (826–827). The study used a constructed measure from the Add Health data set, a binary question asking respondents whether they engaged in a range of political activities (like contributing to a candidate or participating in a political rally) to code for political participation. The political participation variable did not include voting or voter registration, each of which was measured separately. See Kathleen Mullan Harris and J. Richard Udry, “National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health), 1994–2018,” database (Chapel Hill, NC: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2022), <https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/DSDR/studies/21600/versions/V24/summary>; Sara McLanahan, Irwin Garfinkel, Jane Waldfogel, and Kathryn Edin, “Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, Public Use, United States, 1998–2017,” database (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-

university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2019), <https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/DSDR/studies/31622/versions/V2/summary>.

¹¹⁸ Weaver and Lerman, “Political Consequences,” 827.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. Measures for civic participation, as opposed to political participation, were not statistically significant across any independent variable related to policing, which may be a function of low civic participation among the overall population.

¹²⁰ Desmond Ang and Jonathan Tebes, “Civic Responses to Police Violence,” HKS working paper no. RWP20-033, 2020, 20, <https://perma.cc/U6WY-9HH2>. Using detailed voter registration data from Los Angeles County and incident-level data from the *Los Angeles Times* Homicide Database about 294 police killings of civilians that occurred in the county between 2002 and 2010, the researchers were able to analyze how very small geographic differences in exposure to police killings of civilians caused differences in voting patterns.

¹²¹ Ibid., 3.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Amy E. Lerman and Vesla Weaver, “Staying Out of Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 651, no. 1 (2014), 202–219, 211–212, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716213503085>. The paper analyzed a data set of 3 million 311 requests for service from 2010 and 2011. Calls to 311, a nonemergency number through which residents can access government services and lodge noncriminal complaints about a wide variety of public conditions, have been referred to as the “‘front door’ for citizen access to government” (208).

¹²⁵ Ibid., 207.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 211. Surplus stops were defined as stops, frisks, searches, or uses of force resulting in no arrest, summons, or detection of contraband (207).

¹²⁷ Ibid., 213.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 214.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 211–213.

¹³⁰ Amie M. Schuck, “Examining the Community Consequences of Arrests for Low-Level Criminal Activity,” *Journal of Community Psychology* 48, no. 1 (2020), 86–103, 87, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jcop.22238>. The study used 2004 crime data drawn from the city of Chicago’s open data portal, and classified four offense categories, defined by the Unified Crime Reporting system, as “low level”: marijuana possession, sex work, disorderly conduct, and a miscellaneous non-index offense (91).

¹³¹ Ibid., 94–96.

¹³² Ibid., 99.

¹³³ Sarah Brayne, “Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional Attachment,” *American Sociological Review* 79, no. 3 (2014), 367–391, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122414530398>.

¹³⁴ Ibid. The paper used multiwave data from Add Health, analyzing people ages 18 to 26 and 24 to 34. See Harris and Udry, “National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health.”

¹³⁵ Brayne, “Surveillance,” 376–379.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 379–380. The study’s results showed that criminal legal system contact itself predicted lower rates of institutional attachment, irrespective of the type of contact. The author therefore

concluded that the unintended consequences of police stops deserve more attention because they might lead to the same impacts as arrests do (386–387).

¹³⁸ United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “National Longitudinal Surveys,” <https://www.bls.gov/nls/cohorts.htm>, see “NLS Cohorts (Active)”; Princeton University, “Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study,” <https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/>.